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1 Introduction.
This paper explores the effects of centralized and decentralized redistribution on the
efficiency of the allocation of resources.
This question has become increasingly relevant as the debate on fiscal federalism
has picked up momentum in a number of contexts. In the U.S., the "new federalism"
doctrine calls for shifting the financial responsibility of many redistributive programs
from the federal government to the state and local governments. In Europe, the process
of integration will soon have to address the question of which fiscal policy arrangement
should be adopted, and distributive programs will inevitably be at the forefront of the
debate. Indeed, the Maastricht treaty already envisions a substantial harmonization of
social security standards among European countries. Moreover, the recent Danish vote
has shown that worries on the fate of social security in a federal system can be at the
core of the process of integration.
Finally, policy-makers in many countries with a serious budget deficit problem know
very well that the political interests vested in the redistributive programs can make their
reform virtually impossible. In many circumstances, these programs are essentially used
by incumbent politicians to create or perpetuate political consensus around them. To the
extent that politicians do not internalize the full effects of this type of expenditure on the
central budget, this political use of redistribative programs is mdoubtedly a major source
of deficit bias. It is intuitive that a decentralized redistribution, whereby politicians must
rely on the resources of their constituencies to fund redistributive programs, might lead
to lower levels of expenditure.
For all these reasons, it seems relevant to ask whether decentralized or centralized
income redistribution provide the policymakers with more incentives to expand the social
security system. The next step is then to understand how an increase in redistributive
expenditure might affect the allocation of resources in a federal system. In this paper,
we focus on two channels. On the expenditure side, social secuiity alters the alternative
income of unemployed workers and therefore the supply of labor. This effect is obviously
magnified in the presence of labor unions. On the revenue side, the taxes needed to
finance redistributive expenditures alter the after-tax returns to the mobile factors and
therefore their allocation. The question we analyze is whether a particular fiscal policy
arrangement might allow some sectors of the economy to use the fiscal system to their
advantage and, in so doing, impose an inefficient allocation of resources.
The conclusions of this paper depart substantially from the existing literature on the
topic. The traditional view is that income redistribution in a federal system should be
undertaken by the central government. If the welfare of the poor is a national, as opposed
to local, concern, then the assistance to the poor has a dimension of a public good with
the usual problems of underprovision if its supply is decentralized. But even if the rich
in each locality care about the welfare of the poor in the same locality only, there might
be a strong argument in favor of centralized redistribution because of the mobility of
welfare recipients. If local governments were to take responsibility for redistribution,
they would try to export the costs of redistribution by setting lower taxes and transfers
than their neighboring local governments, thereby inducing outmigration of the poor and
immigration of the rich. But if all local governments follow this strategy, the end result is
only a suboptimally low level of redistribution. By contrast, a central government would
internalize the externalities arising from the mobility of welfare recipients and would set
the degree of redistribution at its "optimal" level.1
The central thesis of this paper is that decentralized income redistribution might have
been dismissed too early. The discussion above has already highlighted three important
aspects that have been overlooked by the existing literature: (i) the effects of redistri-
bution on economic activity,2 in particular in the presence of strong labor unions; (ii)
the effects of taxation on the allocation of capital; (iii) the incentives to use the social
security system for political purposes.
Once these elements are incorporated in the analysis, they can tip the balance in
favor of decentralized redistribution. In summary, the argument runs as follows. An
Strictly speaking, these are arguments for common benefit standards, not necessarily for centralized
financing of the programs. Of course, if the proportion of the poor or the fiscal capacity vary markedly
from state to state, then there might be a reason for centralized funding as well.
2Using a different type of model, Johnson (1988) and (1990) analyze the impact of redistributive policies
at the local and central level on labor supply. However, the focus there is completely different from the
question analyzed in this paper.
expansion of redistributive expenditures can reduce labor supply through its effects on the
availability of alternative sources of income. It can also cause an outflow of capital through
two distinct channels: as employment decreases, the return to capital decreases for a given
tax rate on capital; in addition, as the tax rate increases in order to finance the expansion
in the program, the after-tax return to capital decreases for a given employment. A
centralized fiscal policy might allow a region to draw tax revenues from other regions.
This might provide the resources for an expansion of their redistributive programs, with
their distortionary effects. By contrast, in a decentralized fiscal system each region has
to rely on its own resources to finance its redistributive programs. This increases their
economic and political costs, or simply sets a binding constraint on the availability of
fiscal revenues. For all these reasons, a decentralized fiscal policy can be more effective
in checking the expansion of distortionary programs.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the model and then
formalizes it. Section 3 explores the relative effects of centralized and decentralized fiscal
policy on unemployment when capital is immobile. Section 4 does the same for the case
of capital mobility. Both Sections 3 and 4 provide an intuitive discussion of the results
together with their formal derivation. Section 5 compares the effects of centralized fiscal
policy when capital is immobile and mobile respectively. Section 6 concludes by discussing
the results and some of their policy implications.
2 The model.
2.1 The structure of the economy.
Since initially we want to focus on the role of labor markets, we consider two regions,
A and B, which are identical in all respects except in the characteristics of their labor
markets. In region A, all the labor force is organized in a monopolist union that sets the
wage taking the demand for labor as given. In region B the labor market is perfectly
competitive.
Technology is identical in the two regions: each can produce one traded good with
a Cobb-Douglas production function in two factors, labor (L) and capital (K): y =
LaKl~a. Both regions are small, so that the price p of the good is given.3 As a normal-
ization, assume that p = 1.
Factor endowments are also identical. The labor force has size L and the endowment
of capital is K in both regions. Labor is immobile, while capital can be immobile or mobile
across the two regions. We will compare the outcomes of centralized and decentralized
fiscal policies under the two assumptions about capital mobility.
Finally, in both regions there is a measure Lp of retired agents ("pensioners") whose
only source of income is a social security benefit.
2.2 The structure of fiscal policy.
Fiscal policy consists of two redistributive programs hat provide a social security benefit
s to pensioners and an unemployment benefit b to unemployed workers. The size of both
benefits is fixed exogenously.4 Fiscal policy, i.e. tax revenues, determines how many
benefits can be financed and distributed. Total tax revenues must be allocated to pay for
pensions, and then the residual can be used to pay for unemployment benefits. In what
follows, we will assume that the pension s and the unemployment benefit b are the same.
This assumption is made exclusively for analytical convenience, and absolutely nothing
substantial depends on it.
Taxation of capital is the source of revenues used to finance the social security pro-
grams: throughout the paper, the government budget is assumed to be balanced. Capital
is taxed at a fixed rate t per unit of capital. There are convex costs in redistributing
taxes, so that if t is the tax rate, only (t — jt2)K can be redistributed. This ensures that
3Note that, since the number of factors exceeds the number of goods, the factor price equalization
theorem does not apply. However, since the two regions have identical technologies and factor endowments,
if there were no differences in the structure of the labor market and/or fiscal policy, the wage and the return
to capital would be the same in the two regions.
4This assumption is made both for analytical convenience and because it seems realistic. Virtually all
entitlement programs fix the benefit, and the actual expenditure is determined endogenously by the be-
havior of the agency that administers the program. In addition, as we mentioned in the introduction, the
existing literature has convincingly made the case for uniform benefit levels in a federal system. Finally,
this assumption may be particularly relevant to analyze fiscal policy in the context of European integra-
tion, since harmonization of social security standards is an important (and controversial) provision of the
Maastricht treaty.
the tax rate that will be enacted will not exceed —-. Also, tax revenues in each region
cannot exceed j-K, where K is the equilibrium level of capital, which can be different
from K if capital is mobile.
Fiscal policy can be centralized or decentralized. In the former case the tax rate is
common to both regions, and revenues are shared to finance all the subsidies granted in
the two regions. In the latter case each region chooses its own tax rate taking the tax rate
of the other region as given, and subsidies in each region are financed using the revenue?
raised in that region only.
2.3 The structure of the political process.
When the union sets the wage it takes the tax rate as given. The tax rate is then
determined endogenously through majority voting. There are three types of actors in the
political process: holders of capital, workers and pensioners. We assume that each of the
three classes of agents has by itself less than 50% of the total votes. Each individual's
proposed tax rate is the one that maximizes his utility, taking into account that the wage
and therefore employment will be set by the union according to the process described
above.
Utility is linear in expected income. In addition, we assume that pensioners care
about the utility of workers. This is a realistic assumption, and a common one in many
dynamic modelc with overlapping generations. However, none of the results of the paper,
in particular its piopositions, will depend on this assumption. The same results could
be obtained by assuming that workers care about pensioners too, or that neither type
of agents cares about the welfare of the other type of agents. The only function of this
assumption is to shorten the analysis of the voting equilibrium and it makes it slightly
more intuitive.
Often, the situation will arise when an agent will be indifferent between a given tax
rate and all tax rates above it. We assume that in this situation an individual will •"'ote
for the lowest tax rate in the interval where he is indifferent. Again, nothing substantial
hinges on this assumption.
As a matter of realism, we could assume that the pension s must be provided to all
pensioners whenever the fiscal capacity of a region is sufficient to generate enough tax
revenues. In other words, we could assume that the tax rate being voted on has to exceed
the level that raises enough revenues to provide a pension to all retirees. Again, all the
results of this paper go through whether one makes this assumption or not. Only for
expositional simplicity we will not restrict the tax rate.
2.4 The formal model.
The model described in the previous subsection can be formalized in the following way.
In region A, the union chooses employment L to maximize the expected income of its
members taking the tax rate as given and subject to a series of constraints representing
labor demand and fiscal policy constraints. Therefore, the problem of the union in region
A is:5
MaxL wL +1 (1)
s.t.
y-a (2)
I = s(L-L) if L>L,
I = s(L-L) if L<L (3)
L s.t. {t-1t2)K(t,L) = s(Lp + L-L) if (t - jt2)K(t,L) > sLp
L = L if (t-ft2)K(t,L)<sLp (4)
or
L s.t. (t-1t2)2K = s(2Lp + 2L-L-iB) if (i - jt2)2K > s2Lp
L = L if (t - >yt2)2K < s2Lp (5)
5Throughout the paper, all variables refer to region A unless otherwise indicated.
(1) is the expression for the expected income of a union member. Employed workers get
the wage w, which is a function of employment L through the labor demand function
(2). Unemployed workers get the unemployment subsidy s after pensioners are given a
pension. This is captured by the function / that appears in expression (1) and is specified
in (3). The cut-off level of employment L that appears in (3) is defined implicitly in (4)
and (5) as that level of employment such that tax revenues are enough to pay the benefit
s for the Lp pensioners and exactly L — L unemployed workers for any given t. Thus,
L — L is the maximum level of unemployment that can be financed with the existing tax
revenues.
Equations (4) refer to the case of decentralized fiscal policy. Here the tax base is A",
which is a function of t and L if capital is mobile and is identically equal to K if capital is
immobile. The interpretation of equations (4) is the following. The first line refers to the
case where, at the given tax rate, tax revenues are more than enough to pay the pension
s to the Lp pensioners. Therefore, tax revenues in excess of sLp can be used to finance
the unemployment benefit of up to L — L workers that the union might decide to leave
unemployed. The second line refers to the case where total tax revenues at the given t
are not sufficient to pay a pension to Lp pensioners when the capital stock is maximum,
i.e. at L = L. A fortiori, then, tax revenues will be insufficient to finance a pension to
all Lp retirees when the capital stock is lower, ;..e. when there is soiiie unemployment.
This means that at the existing tax rate no unemployment benefit can be paid out to
unemployed workers: the maximum level of unemployment that can be subsidized by tax
revenues is 0, i.e. L = L.
The definition of L when fiscal policy is centralized is given in equations (5), and
is similar the case of decentralized fiscal policy. The tax base is now 2 A", regardless of
whether capital is mobile or immobile, since the tax rate is common to both regions and
revenues are shared. The interpretation of the first Une is that total tax revenues are
used first to pay a pension to the Lp pensioners in both regions, and then to subsidize
unemployed workers in A and B, until revenues are exhausted when L — L workers
are unemployed in A and L — Lg obtain the unemployment subsidy in B. The second
line says that, if tax revenues are not sufficient to cover a pension for all pensioners in
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the two regions, then a fortiori no unemployed worker can receive an unemployment
subsidy. Consequently, the maximum level of unemployment that can be subsidized by
tax revenues is again 0, i.e. L = L.
Thus, Lit) that appears in (3) can be interpreted as the level of employment "con-
strained" by the availability of the alternative income s for the unemployed agents, i.e.
constrained by the tax rate t.6 Essentially, L(t) is such that L — L(t) is the maximum
number of unemployed agents that can receive a subsidy given that the tax rate is t and
the budget is balanced. We will often refer to mint L(t) as the level of employment con-
strained by fiscal policy. Should the union decide to have, say, V < L employed workers,
L — V of the unemployed workers will not receive any unemployment benefit. For future
reference, it will be useful to define the "unconstrained" level of employment, L, as that
level of employment that the union would choose if the benefit s were available to all its
unemployed members automatically. Thus, L is obtained by maximizing wL + s(L — L)
subject only to the expression for the demand for labor, (2). It is obvious that the anal-
ysis of this paper is meaningful only if L < L, i.e. if s is sufficiently large so that the
union would choose to have positive unemployment if the subsidy was available to all
unemployed workers.
In region B, the level of employment is determined by the condition that w(L) = s if
L > LB and L = L# if W(LB < s, where Lg is defined analogously to (5).
From now on, we will assume that w(L,K) > s. Thus, in region B all workers will
strictly prefer to work rather than claim the unemployment benefit. As a result, as long
as capital does not decrease all L workers will be employed in B. In A, however, some
unemployment may be ex ante optimal for unionized workers even if w(L, K) > s.
6
 Under decentralized fiscal policy, the tax base K can also vary. L is therefore constrained by t and K.
2.5 Unemployment and efficiency.
It is important to note that in region A GDP is decreasing in the number of workers
that obtain the subsidy s. Indeed, in this model
GDP = LaKl~a (6)
and therefore
The first term in the r.h.s. of eq. (6) is equal to the wage to, while the second term
is zero when capital is immobile and positive when capital is mobile. Thus, dGJ^p is
always positive. Of course, when capital is mobile and employment decreases in A,
GDP increases in B because capital flows to B while employment remains constant at L.
However, the increase in B's GDP is always less than the decrease in A's GDP. This is
obvious if we start from an initial position of full employment and no distortions in both
regions, but can be easily proved to be true even if employment in A decreases from an
initial level of less than full employment.
However, one has to be clear about what this negative relation between GDP and
unemployment tells us. In this model, unemployment is voluntary, at least in an ex ante
sense. Therefore, it might seem that there is nothing "bad" in having more unemploy-
ment. Moreover, since the equilibrium is the result of a voting process, it is necessarily
(constrained) Pareto optimal, in the sense that it corresponds to the preferred outcome of
at least one group of agents. All we can state is therefore that a frequently used measure
of economic well-being, GDP', is negatively correlated to the rate of unemployment. A
stronger version of this statement is that, if non-distortionary ways to redistribute income
were available, everybody could be made better off by a reduction in unemployment.
3 Fiscal policies with immobile capital.
In this section, we characterize the outcome of centralized and decentralized redistributive
fiscal policies when capital is immobile. Since full employment always prevails in B,
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from now on we will concentrate on the equilibrium in region A. In solving the model,
we proceed in two steps. We first characterize the unconstrained level of employment,
i.e. the level of employment the union would choose if the subsidy were available to
all its unemployed members. We denote the unconstrained levels of employment as
Lcl'c and Lct'd respectively, where the superscript "cz" stands for "capital immobility",
"c" stands for "centralized" and "<i" stands for "decentralized". We then characterize
the constrained level of employment, i.e. the employment that is compatible with the
maximum possible number of workers being given the subsidy s given the tax rate t. For
any given t, we denote the constrained level of employment as Lct'c(t) and Lctfd(t) for the
case of centralized and decentralized fiscal policies respectively.
We then proceed to determine what is the tax rate and therefore the level of employ-
ment chosen through the political process.
3.1 The feasible set of fiscal policies.
When capital is immobile, the unconstrained level of employment is the same under
both fiscal policy regimes. The reason is that the unconstrained level of employment
depends only on the equilibrium level of capital, not on total tax revenues. Since capital
is immobile, the equilibrium stock of capital is identically equal to K in e,ach region.
Formally, maximization of wL + s(L — L) subject to (2) only, with K(t,L) = K, gives





lKl~awhere w = aLa lKl~a and act is the (negative of the) elasticity of employment to the
real wage for a given stock of capital, i.e. acl = z^ with the Cobb-Douglas specification
adopted here. Plugging these expressions for w and acl into eq. (8), the unconstrained
levels of employment Lctfd and Lct>c are defined implicitly by:
a2La-lKl-a = s (9)
The constrained levels of employment do differ across the fiscal policy regimes, because
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the tax revenues available to subsidize unemployed workers in A are different in the two
cases. When fiscal policy is decentralized, unemployed workers in A can be subsidized
out of tax revenues collected in A only. Therefore, for any given tax rate t, Lcl'd(t) is
defined implicitly by:
2
 s{Lp + l-L) (10)
To fix ideas, we initially assume that the maximum possible number of unemployed
workers that can be sustained in region A when fiscal policy is decentralized is "small":
mint L°hd(t) = Lct'd(t = ^ ) = L — e7. The interpretatior is that region A can sustain
only a small number of unemployed workers when it must rely on its own resources to
subsidize them. This assumption allows us to consider an isolated region whose redis-
tributive system is limited by the size of the region and consequently can induce very
little distortion in the allocation of resources. This is the most natural and interesting
starting point to answer the question we posed at the beginning, namely whether inte-
gration can lead to more distortions via the increased redistribution made possible by
the enlargement of the fiscal system.8
When fiscal policy is centralized all tax revenues collected in B that are not used to
place B's pensioners on social security can be spent to place A's unemployed workers on
social security. For any given common tax rate t the constrained level of employment
Lcl>c(t) in A is now defined implicitly by:
(i - jt2)2K = s{2Lp + L-L) (11)
3.2 The political equilibrium.
Consider first the political equilibrium under our starting point, decentralized fiscal policy.
The problem we are analyzing is interesting only if the level of employment desired by
the union, Lcl)d, is less than full employment. If this were not the case, the solution would
7Note that, because capital is immobile, the tax base is constant and therefore the maximum tax
revenues is obtained at the tax rate that maximizes (t — 7<2), i.e. t = j - .
8However, while Proposition 1 would be essentially unaffected if this assumption were relaxed, Propo-
sition 2 would become less general, although it would still hold under fairly loose sufficient conditions.
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be trivial: workers and the union simply would not be interested in taking advantage of
the opportunity of earning a positive unemployment subsidy, and L would be the level
of employment under both fiscal policy regimes.
Under the assumption that Lctfd < L, and since Lct'd(t = ^-) is close to Z, we will
initially assume that Lctyd(t = ^-) > LChd. This is clearly the most interesting case:
it implies that the union would ask for a higher wage if only the workers that become
unemployed could be subsidized through the fiscal system. It is however important to note
that the main result of this section, Proposition 1, still holds with a minor modification
when Lctid(t = j - ) is allowed to be both smaller and larger than Lct'd.9 We limit ourselves
to the exposition of this case because it brings out more directly the intuition of the
mechanisms at work here.
The utility of workers in A is maximized at t = j - , because this is the tax rate that
brings employment as close as possible to the unconstrained level. Pensioners' expected
income is constant at s for any tax rate in excess of t^ , where t]_,p is defined as the tax
rate that finances exactly Lp pensions: {t^ — ^ t\ )K = sLp. As long as pensioners attach
any positive weight to the utility of workers, pensioners too will therefore vote for t = j - .
Hence, both workers and pensioners in A vote for t = j - , while obviously capitalists vote
for t = 0. Therefore, a majority of agents votes for t — j - , and Lcx'd(t = ^-) is the
resulting level of employment.
When fiscal policy is centralized, there are two possibilities. If LChd > LctjC(t =
j - ) , both workers and pensioners in A will vote for the tax rate that finances exactly
Lp -f L — LChC pensions in A. This is defined implicitly by equation (11) with L = Lcl'c.
Workers and pensioners in B are indifferent to any tax rate, as long as it is enough to
finance the subsidy to the Lp pensioners. Consequently, the equilibrium tax rate will be
the one that finances 2Lp + L — LcliC subsidies, and Lct'c is the resulting employment.
If Lcild < Zct'c(t = j - ) , again all agents in A will vote for t = tmax = ^-, and this
is the tax rate that will prevail since a majority of voters in B are indifferent between
and the (lower) tax rate that finances exactly Lp subsidies. The equilibrium level of
9The minor modification is that the inequality of Proposition 1 is now a weak one instead of a strong
one.
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employment in A is then Lct'c(t = j-)>
Therefore, under centralized fiscal policy, the level of employment resulting from the
political equilibrium is min lLcl'd,Lct'c(t — ^-)\. Since both are smaller than Lct'd(t =
^-), the equilibrium level of employment under decentralized fiscal policy, we can state:
Proposition 1;
When capital is immobile across regions, employment in region A is lower under central-
ized fiscal policy than under decentralized fiscal policy.
3.3 Intuition for the result.
The mechanism operating here is exclusively a fiscal policy effect. The elasticity of labor
demand to the wage remains constant across the two regimes, and so does the markup of
the wage on the unemployment benefit s. The target level of employment for the union,
L, is therefore the same in the two regimes. However, a centralized fiscal policy enables
workers and pensioners in A to use all the tax revenues collected in B (in excess of those
needed to subsidize B's Lp pensioners) to subsidize unemployed workers in A. If the tax
revenues collected through A's tax system constrained the wage demands of the union
under decentralized fiscal system, this possibility of using B's tax revenues will relax a
binding constraint and will reduce employment in A.
The key question is then: how is it possible for worker^ and pensioner0 in A to gather
the political consensus of workers and pensioners in B to what is essentially a transfer
of resources from B to A? The answer is that, since capital is immobile, the high tax
rate advocated by workers and pensioners in A hits only capital in B, not the wage. As
a result, workers and pensioners in B are not opposed to the implicit subsidization of
unemployment in A on the part of holders of capital in B.
4 Fiscal policies with capital mobility.
We now consider the outcomes of centralized and decentralized fiscal policies when capital
is mobile. The main difference with respect to the case of immobile capital is that now
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the marginal returns to capital in A and B must be equalized. Therefore, in equilibrium
it must be the case that:10
Hence, with capital mobility there are two reasons for capital to flow from one region to
another: (i) tax rates can be different in the two regions and (ii) even if the tax rates are
the same, if there is unemployment in A the marginal returns to capital can be equalized
only if some capital flows from A to B.
In what follows, we denote the unconstrained level of employment with centralized
and decentralized fiscal policy by LcniyC and Lcm'd respectively, where the superscript "cm"
stands for "capital mobility" and "c", " d" have the same meaning as before. Similarly, we
denote by Lcm'c(t) and Lcm'd(t) the constrained levels of employment under centralized
and decentralized fiscal policy respectively.
4.1 The feasible set of fiscal policies.
Under centralized fiscal policy, t^ = ts identically and capital flows occur only because
of differences in unemployment rates. Therefore, K is a function of t through L only.
Indeed, from eq. (12) with t = tB and K = 2K — KB one obtains:
A
Consider first the unconstrained level of employment under centralized fiscal pol-
icy, Z,cm'c. The (negative of the) elasticity of the wage to employment is the inverse of
the (negative of the) elasticity of employment to the wage, acm. Given the Cobb-Douglas
specification of the model, one can write:
J 1 1
10Recall that variables without a subscript refer to region A.
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Using (13), after some manipulation one can show that
dlogK L/K L
dlogL (L + L)/KB L + L
It follows that
(15)
Therefore, <jcm'c > act = y ^ . The unconstrained level of employment is now determined
by
S < 7 C m ' C ,
 N
w = (17)
aCTTl,C _ I V /
where <jcm'c is given by eq. (14). Using (15):
w = aKl-aLa-1 = a{2Kf-a{L + L)a~l (18)
Plugging these expressions into eq. (17), Lcm'c is now defined implicitly by:
a(2K)1-a(L + L)a-\L + aL) = s (19)
After some manipulation, it is possible to show that the l.h.s. of (19), evaluated at L =
Lcl'c, is greater than s. Since the l.h.s. of (19) is decreasing in Z-, the value of L that
satisfies (19), I,cm'c, must be higher than the value of L that satisfies (9), Zct'c.
The unconstrained level of employment under decentralized fiscal policy, Lcm'd, is
more difficult to determine. When capital is mobile and each region decides on its own
tax rate, both reasons for capital mobility are present, namely differences in tax rates and
differences in unemployment rates. Therefore, now the unconstrained level of employment
depends on the tax rates adopted by the two countries, and in general it is impossible to
determine analytically whether Lcm'd is larger or smaller than Lcm'c.
Fortunately, however, this does not prevent us from characterizing the levels of em-
ployment that prevail, in equilibrium, under the two regimes. All we need is the con-
strained levels of employment, LCTn'c(t) and Lcm4(t).
It is easy to show that Lcm'c(t) = Lct'c(t). Under both fiscal policy regimes the tax
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base is the same, because under centralized fiscal policy capital is taxed at the same rate
regardless of where it is located.
As to the unconstrained level of employment under decentralized fiscal policy, LCTn'd(t),
under our normalization it is equal to L \/t. In fact, our starting point was a region whose
fiscal system in isolation could sustain a very low rate of unemployment: LChd(t = j - )
= L — e. When capital is mobile, it is in the interest of B's workers to attract as much
capital as they can from A, since this will increase their wage without obviously affecting
employment. Therefore, it is a dominant strategy for workers in B to vote for ts = 0
regardless of the tax rate in A. Given this, in A the lowest level of employment that can
be sustained, mint Lcm'd(t), is the lowest value over t of the solutions for L to:
(t - ~ft2)K(t, L) = s(Lp + L - L) (20)
The l.h.s. is strictly less than j-K since in equilibrium K < K, and K = K only for
t = 0,L = L. Therefore, mint LCTn4(t) is strictly greater than Lci4(t = ±) = L-e. The
normalization adopted is exactly that e is small enough so that mint Lcm4(t) = L.
4.2 The political equilibrium.
To analyze the political equilibrium under centralized fiscal policy, it is useful to distin-
guish two cases. Assume first that LCTn'c > LCTriyC(t = j-)- Workers in A can reach the
unconstrained level of employment by voting for the tax rate defined implicitly by:
(t - ft2)2K = s(2Lv + L- £cm'c) (21)
At this tax rate, all pensioners in A can obtain the subsidy s. Since they care about
the utility of workers, they will vote for the same tax rate as workers do. As to workers
in region B, their interest is to generate as much unemployment as possible in region
A so that capital will flow from A to B and this, in turn, will increase the wage in B.
Therefore, workers in B will vote for the same tax rate as workers in A.11 Pensioners in
11
 Recall that any tax rate above this will not decrease employment in A.
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B will then also vote for the same tax rate. Although for different reasons, all workers
and pensioners in the two regions will all agree on a common tax rate, one that brings
about the unconstrained level of employment in A.
Now consider what happens when Lcm'c < Lcm'c(t = j - ) . Workers in region A will vote
for t = tmax = j - , so that the resulting level of employment will be as close as possible to
the unconstrained one. Pensioners in region A will also vote for t = tmax = y- as long as
they attach a positive weight to the utility of workers. The optimal strategy for workers
in region B is again to push employment as low as possible in region A. Thus, workers
in B will vote for t = tmax = ^-, and so will pensioners in B who care for the utility of
workers. The equilibrium level of employment in region A will then be Lcm'c(t = y-).
The political equilibrium when fiscal policy is decentralized is immediate. Since work-
ers in A cannot obtain any benefit at any tax rate because tax revenues are simply not
large enough, they will vote for t = 0 so at to avoid any outflow of capital and the re-
sulting decrease in wages. Capitalists too of course vote for t = 0. Thus, in region A a
majority of agents vote for t — 0 and as a result there is no unemployment in region A.
Since both the two possible equilibrium outcomes under centralized fiscal policy, £cm'c
and Lcm'c(t = ^-), are smaller than L, we have:
Proposition 2:
When capital is mobile, employment is lover under centralized fiscal policy than under
decentralized fiscal policy.
4.3 Intuition for the results.
The mechanism at work here is the effects of an increased tax rate on the stock of capital
in region A. When workers in A try to expand the social security system by raising the tax
rate, they now face an outflow of capital for two distinct reasons: (i) as unemployment
increases, the return to capital decreases in A; (ii) for a given tax rate in the other region,
the after-tax return to capital in A is now lower than in the other region. Since the tax
rate in a centralized setting is common to both regions, only the first reason for a capital
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outflow is present under centralized fiscal policy.
In turn, an outflow of capital is bad for workers for two distinct reasons: (a) it de-
creases the wage for any given level of employment and (b) in a decentralized system only,
it decreases tax revenues available to finance the social security system for unemployed
workers. Again, only the first effect of a capital outflow is present when fiscal policy is
centralized.
It is now clear that centralized fiscal policy provides a less effective check on the
inefficiency of the allocation of resources resulting from the political equilibrium in A
than a decentralized fiscal policy setting. It is also important to note that the constraints
imposed by fiscal policy are crucial here: if one were to compare the unconstrained levels
of employment under capital mobility, in general it will be higher under centralized than
under decentralized fiscal policy.
As in the case of immobile capital, it is important to understand why workers and
pensioners in region B would not by themselves provide a check on the implicit transfer
of resources from region B to region A that occurs in a centralized fiscal policy setting
when A's workers and pensioners try to maximize the size of the social security system.
The reason is that it is in the interest of B's workers and pensioners to generate as
much unemployment as possible in A, so that capital will flow to B and wages there
will increase. Under centralized fiscal policy, the way to create unemployment in A is to
redistribute as much income as possible from holders of capital to unemployed workers
in A by expanding the social security system.
5 An alternative interpretation.
The result that centralized redistribution can generate higher unemployment than decen-
tralized redistribution was driven essentially by differences in the structure of the labor
markets in the two regions. The model lends itself to a different interpretation, one that
relies on differences in the administration of the social security system.
Indeed, an important distinction must be made between funding and administering
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a program at the local level.12 Even when the standards are set at the central level
and the program is funded through revenue sharing from tax revenues collected at the
central level, it is often the case that local government have a certain discretion in the
administration of the program. By being more or less generous in accepting applications,
a local government has a potentially large leverage on total redistributive expenditures
within its boundaries.13
This politically motivated use of the social security system for patronage purposes
might be an empirically relevant phenomenon in certain political systems where incum-
bent governments must rely heavily on this type of expenditure to bolster their support.
For instance, the average ratio of disability pensions to old-age pensions in Italy is 30%,
but it increases to 130% in the South and it peaks at 626% in the Enna province in Sicily.
Or, public employees in Italy can retire after 15 years of seniority with a government pen-
sion. Effectively, then, when used for patronage purposes a social security system can
become a very good substitute for a permanent unemployment benefit, i.e. a pension.
In terms of the model developed so far, the effects of these politically induced use of
redistributive programs can be formalized as follows. The structure of the labor market
is now the same in both regions: the labor force is organized in a monopoly union that
sets the wage taking labor demand as given. What differs across regions is now the
administrative standards o? social security. In both regions, A and B, pensioners have
the right tc a pension s. In addition, in A workers who apply can receive, say, an invalidity
pension b if tax revenues are sufficient. As in the first version of the model, we make the
simplifying but innocuous assumption that b = s. The reservation wage is therefore 0 in
B and s in A. This means that the union will always set the wage at its full employment
level in B, while in A it will take advantage of the positive reservation wage by generating
some unemployment.
12For our purposes, it is irrelevant whether it is the local government or the local branch of a central
government agency that administer the program at the local level.
1QOnce again, the literature is frirly unanimous on this point: local governments should participate
in the administration of redistributive programs, particularly means-tested ones, because they possess
informational and other administrative advantages over the central government (see for instance Ladd
and Doolittle (1982)). As a matter of fact, in the U.S., about 70% of expenditures connected to welfare
programs is administered by local governments.
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The model that formalizes these ideas looks exactly like the one developed in the
preceding sections. The solution of the model is the same under the two interpretations;
in particular, both Propositions 1 and 2 still hold under the new interpretation. In
addition, the mechanisms behind the results work much the same way in the two versions.
Consider,a s usual, the case of immobile capital first. When the social security sys-
tem is used for political purposes to different degrees in different regions, centralized
funding of the system can generate a perverse outcome. Regions with looser administra-
tive standards can "free-ride" on the tax revenues collected in other regions to pursue
their generous use of social security benefits for political purposes. Conversely, when the
funding of redistributive expenditure is decentralized, local governments can rely only on
local sources to fund their social security programs. This automatically constrains the
use of social security for political purposes. Because the expansion of the social security
system would induce unemployment through its effects on the behavior of the union, a
decentralized fiscal policy also limits unemployment.
Suppose now the process of integration between the two regions has increased the
mobility of capital across them. Now the fiscal policy setting matters for at least two
reasons. First, even when capital is immobile, if a common level of taxation is decided at
the central level the region with looser administration of benefits will be able to finance
more pensions to unemployed workers by free-riding on the resources drawn from the re-
gion with stricter requirements. Ceteris paribus, this will tend to increase unemployment
in the region with a looser fiscal policy administration. Second, when capital is mobile,
setting the tax rate at the centralized level will reduce the marginal cost of increasing
the tax rate in every region, since capital will face the same tax rate everywhere and a
region will not lose capital to another if the common tax rate is increased. The region
with most incentives to set a high common tax rate is the one with looser administrative
requirements, because only there can workers take advantage of higher tax revenues. Cen-
tralized tax setting therefore increases the incentives to set a high tax rate, and increases
unemployment in the regions where tax revenues can be used to subsidize unemployed
workers.
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6 Discussion of the results.
The model developed in this paper illustrates a simple but fairly general point. When-
ever some actors have an incentive to distort the allocation of resources by using the
redistributive system to their advantage, centralizing income redistribution might pro-
vide more revenues to pursue this strategy. This occurs for two main reasons: (i) in a
centralized fiscal policy setting, a region may free-ride on the tax revenues of other re-
gions whose individuals do not have the same incentives to use the redistributive system
to their advantage; (ii) when capital is mobile, a centralized fiscal policy setting reduces
the cost of increasing the tax rate on capital in a region in order to increase revenues.
Since the tax rate is common to all regions, the higher tax rate will not induce an outflow
of capital caused by a decrease in the relative after-tax return to capital.
For this story to be relevant, regions must differ substantially in the structures of their
labor markets and/or in the structure of their political systems, along the lines described
above. Our contention is that this is indeed the case in at least two contexts among those
briefly discussed in the Introduction. In Europe, the structures of the labor markets
differs widely across countries. Perhaps even more importantly, the political systems and
the incentives they provide to use fiscal policy for political purposes seem to vary greatly.
The same variability in the attitudes of the political systems to redistributive fiscal policy
seems to be present in Italy, as suggested by the figures on the propox'tion of disability
pensions in various regions clued in the preceding section.
If these impressions survive a more rigorous empirical investigation, the message of
the model is clear. European policy-makers should probably be less enthusiastic of a
common social security system with uniform standards financed through revenue-sharing,
and national legislators should consider attributing some financial responsibility for social
security programs to regional governments.
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